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The Politics of Ocean Pollution: The Third Law of 
the Sea Conference and International Structures for 
Evironmental Protection. 
I. INTRODUOTION 
Since the emergence of the Industrial Age, the prevalent con-
ception of the world's oceans as a vast resource which states are 
free to use l and consequently to pollute, has failed to provide 
a program to maximize the sea's wealth. Technological growth 
coupled with rapid population increase has resulted in the use 
of the oceans as a receptacle for the wastes which are the by-
product of an industrialized society. While scientists are only 
now beginning to catalog and assess man's destructive activ-
ities, world leaders have recognized2 the need for a collective 
effort-the United Nations Third Law of the Sea Conference-
. to protect the ocean's resources. 
This comment will examine the Conference's proposed solu-
tion to the problems of pollution of the oceans.s Initially, the 
focus will be upon the necessary scientific, economic, and philo-
sophical concepts which must form the foundation of a new 
pollution control regime. The present structure for interna-
tional control of ocean pollution will then be discussed. Finally, 
the work of the Conference in developing new institutions for 
international control of ocean pollution will be examined. 
1 For a detailed discussion of the growth and implications of the doctrine of free 
use of the seas see notes 27-30, infra. 
~ This recognition by the world community is manifested in several pronounce-
ments of the United Nations. See notes 44-46, infra. 
B See § III, mfra. 
~83 
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The purpose of this comment is to demonstrate that the pol-
lution control techniques developed by the Third Law of the 
Sea Conference fail to establish a system which might reason-
ably be expected to significantly reduce the increasing level of 
pollution entering the oceans. Rather, the Conference creates 
international structures which institutionalize the notion that 
the marine environment must be sacrificed for economic growth. 
II. THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS 
The alternative to the establishment of a powerful inter-
national institution for pollution control-the present amalgam 
of control by individual nations, multilateral agreements, and 
often no control at allf-has so fully failed to control pollution 
of the oceans that development of a new international structure 
is required.1i This conclusion is the outgrowth of a recognition 
that ocean pollution is presently at dangerous levels, that those 
4 The present structure of international control of ocean pollution is discussed in 
§ II, mfra. 
Ii Some commentators have suggested that pollution of the oceans should be 
regulated by individual states rather than by international structures: 
Pollutants are national rather than international in origin, and thus require 
national rather than international action for their control. Moreover, the 
prime sources of these pollutants are in the industrialized states, who can more 
easily eo-ordinate their own national controls than can 138 soyereign states, 
most of whom feel little if any direct inyolvement-except in the role of 
innocent victims--and are willing to discuss the problem forever before accept-
ting any responsibility. Butte, "Controlling Marine Pollution-World Task or 
Nationalf" 8 STANFORD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 99, 101 (1973). 
Similar disillusionment with international institutions has prompted Professor 
Chayes to suggest that: 
It requires very little acquaintance with the international system as presently 
constituted to realize that it would be unable (to legislate and enforce pollu-
tion standards). The resources both for legislation and enforcement at the 
international level are painfully slender, and they are not likely to be increased 
in the immediate future. 
Chayes, "International Institutions for the Environment ", in Law, Instituti07ls 
and the Global Environment 2 (Hargrove, ed. 1972). 
However, because of the reasons explained in § I infra, if a solution is to be 
found, it must be on the international level. For additional support for this view 
see : National Petroleum Council, " Protection of the Marine Environment" 8 
Natural Resources Lawyer, 511 (1975-76); Schacter and Serwer, "Marine Pollu-
tion Problems and Remedies," 65 AM. J. 01' INT'L. L. 84 (1971). 
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levels are increasing rapidly, and that international economic 
realities preclude most individual states from controlling their 
own sources of pollution. 
A) Scope of the Pollution Problem 
It is initially necessary to examine the sources and severity 
of the pollution problem for these factors will indicate what 
international responses are reasonably warranted. 
Scientists have employed varied techniques for classifying 
pollution and pollutants.8 The most useful system of classifica-
tion for this examination of the need for international controls 
is one which identifies the sources of pollution.T 
More than ninety percent of the pollution which enters the 
oceans is the result of activities oulands within the jurisdiction 
of a nation.s This pollution enters the oceans through: manmade 
pipeline systems which carry wastes directly into the seas, 
natural waterways which lead into the oceans, and the atmo-
sphere. 
8Pollu~on has been defined by the United Nations as: 
Introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the 
marine environment resulting in such deleterious effects as harm to Dvmg 
resources, hazard to human health, hindrance to marine activities including ftah-
ing, impairment of quality for use as sea water and reduction of amenities. 
Definition adopted by the Inter-governmental Oceanographic Commission based on 
a definition originally prepared by a SCORI ACMRR working group. Also accepted 
by the Joint IMCO/FAO/UNESCO/WMOjWHOI AEA/U.N. Group of Experts on 
the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP). U.N. Doc. A 7750, PART I, 
3, (Nov. 10, 1969). 
T This classification system is particularly useful for development of international 
institutions for it indicates what forms of controls must be imposed on what activ-
ities. See Commoner, "The Causes of Pollution", 13 ENVIRONMENT 8 (Aprll1971). 
The panoply of classification systems has been described as: 
One sign of the lack of conceptual framework for consideration of international 
environmental problems •.• (which is) .•. partly a result of dealing with 
environmental problems as an adjunct to other concerns or on a past-crisis bases. 
Bleicker, " An Overview of International Environmental Regulation," 2 
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY 1,2 (1972). 
For other methods of categorizing pollutants see: Hardy, Michael "Definition 
and Forms of Pollution," III NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW 01' THE SItA, Vo. III, 
(1973). 
S The National Counell on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, Annual 
Report 20, 41 (April 1970), 
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The remaining pollution is the result of human activity on 
the water, including dumping wastes from vessels, pollution 
intentionally caused by the normal operation of vessels, and 
accidental pollution. 
There is little need in the present context to quantify the 
amounts of pollutants which are entering the oceans. There 
is little doubt that industrialized nations are depositing large 
quantities of a variety of destructive pollutants into the oceans.9 
As levels of industrialization increase and greater levels of 
economic development are attained in underdeveloped states, 
the level of pollution will also increase.1o 
Supplemental to this gross increase in pollutants, the poten-
tial for unforeseen, catastrophic results of pollution also in-
creases. New chemical substances are being created at the rate 
of 500 per yearY Increased numbers and afiluence among the 
world population will require additional dependence on chemical 
substances. While it is difficult to predict precisely the impact 
of the introduction of these substances into the marine environ-
ment, the potential for unforeseen catastrophe arises with each.12 
9 For detailed examination of the quantity and types of pollutants being deposited 
in the oceans and their potential harms see: Report of the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Human Environment held at Stockholm (5-16 June, 1972), U_N. Doc_ 
A/C 48/14 (1972); Carter, "Global Environment: MIT Study Looks for Signs of 
Danger," 164 Sciencc 204 (1969); Schaeter and Serwer, note 5, supra_ 
10 This relationship between population growth and increased consumption has 
been stated that mankind's production and consumption will triple as its popula-
tion doubles_ Humpstone," Pollution: Precedent and Prospect," 49 FOREIGN AITAIRS 
325, 328 (1972). 
For the link between production and population and levels of pollution see Utton, 
"International Water Quality Law" 13 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL 282 (1973)_ 
It bas been noted, however, that the correct mechanism for controlling pollution is 
not to control population or economic growth. Jackson, C_ 1. "The Dimensions of 
International Pollution," 50 OREGON LAW REVIEW 223, 223 (1971). 
11 Main Impact on the GZobalEnvironment A8se8sment and Recommendations tor 
Actions. Report of the Study of Critical Environmental Problems, 180 (1970). 
12 The most obvious, documented cases of unforeseen disasters occurring include 
the eifects of chlorinated hydrocarbons, see Riseborough, R. W., "Chlorinated 
Hydrocarbons in Marine Eco-Systems" in Chemical Fallottt: Current Research on 
Persistent Pesticiiles; (N. Miller and G_ Berg ed. 1969); Woodwell, "Toxic Sub-
stanees and Ecological Cycles," 216 SCIENTIJ'IC AMERICAN 24 (March 1967); para-
thian, a pesticide developed to eliminate the harms of DDT , New York Times, 
Aug. 21, 1970, p. 1, col. 4 and the tragedy caused hy mercury poisoning at Minamato, 
Japan, Schacter and Serwer, not.e 5, supra, p. 102. 
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The problem of increased pollution levels is exascerbated by 
the fact that remedial action to cleanse the oceans once polluted 
would be ineffective because the residence time of a pollutant 
in a body of water is directly related to its size.18 Once polluted, 
the oceans will remain polluted. 
Thus, several factors combine to create an increasingly more 
dangerous situation: (1) the high levels of pollutants now en-
tering the oceans; (2) the proportionate increase in pollution 
levels as population and industrialization increase; (3) the ab-
sence of scientific knowledge of the potential effects of certain 
effiuents; and (4) the difficulty of eliminating pollution once it 
has entered the ocean. 
While the marine environment is not in immediate danger 
of total destruction,14 the international community can no longer 
postpone the development of international pollution controls. 
Destruction, some of it irreparable, is presently occurring. 
There is a constant potential for local, unforeseen, catastro-
phies and the longer the international community hesitates, the 
greater the difficulty of eliminating pollution now present. Fi-
nally, once the Third Law of the Sea Conference reaches a con-
sensus, it may be difficult to reconvene the world's nations to 
respond to a bleaker outlook in the future. lII 
18 The self-cleansing process in the ocean is so slow that it has been stated that: 
The residence time concept has little meaning for a particle of water in the 
ocean • • • There is no flow-through in the ocean in the usual sense ••• gen-
erally speaking, the pollutants do not evaporate. They remain in the ocean until 
such time as they are degraded or sink to the bottom. Knauss, "Ocean Pollu-
tion: Status and Prognostication," iu Law of the Sea: The Emerging Begim of 
the Ocean, Proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute, Eighth Annual Con-
ference, 313, 321-22, (Abamble, and G. Ponticruo, eds. 1973). 
For further examination of the problems created by the extended residence time of 
ocean waters see Jackson, 246, note 10, 8'Upra. 
14 There is now a consensus opinion among the scientific community that the ocean 
environment is not near collapse, but that there are presently destructive activities, 
uncertainty and risk_ Chayes, 2, note 5, supra. 
111 It has been noted, see note 5, 8'Upra, that the international community responds 
slowly to most crises_ This is true both because of the slow process of drafting and 
signing a convention and because of the delays in ratification. Failure of the Law 
of the Sea Conference to create viable international structures would leave us "one 
step behind the next maJor pollution disaster." Blicher, "An Overview of Inter-
national Environmental Regulation," 2 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY I, 51 (1972). 
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B) Economic Realities Preclude Control by Individual States-
The Need to Internalize Diseconomies 
1. THE COMMONS EFFECT-THE OCEAN AS A FREE GOOD 
While some form of action is required to control marine pol-
lution, most nations or regional organizations will not respond 
to this need by instituting effective pollution control programs. 
Nations have traditionally looked upon the ocean's resources 
as a "free good." 18 The oceans are a resource which may be 
employed for discharge of wastes by individual states without 
any cost to those states. 
Thus, the economic costs of water pollution-damage to the 
ocean environment-are "externalized." In other words, the 
economic activities of the political unit generate effects which 
are external to it, the international community suffers the harm 
created by the polluter at no cost to the polluter. Such external 
costs are not taken into account when most nations decide 
whether and how much to pollute.17 It is only to the interna-
tional community as a whole that pollution control is advanta-
geous for it is that community which suffers damage. Even 
in the international community, pollution control only becomes 
economically advantageous when the levels of pollution become 
so destructive that their costs to that community outweigh 
the costs of abatement. 
Because of this external nature of pollution costs and the dis-
economies 18 of abatement for the polluter, most nations will not 
18 For the philosophical analogy to this concept see § IC, infra. For an exten-
sive discussion of ocean waters as a free good and the commons, effect on the environ-
ment see: Knuse and Bower, Managing Water Quality: Economica, Technology, 
IMtitutwna, 75-97 (1968). 
17 Economics from failure of individual polluters to control their pollution are 
gained at the expense of third parties or the environment. Such economics will 
precipitate increased hazards of pollution. The more an enterprise is permitted to 
expose third parties to harm, or the environment to deterioration, the more it will 
be in a position to reduce its operating costs. Goldie, " International Principle of 
Responsibility for Pollution," 9 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 283, 
284 (1970). 
18 For an extended discussion of external economies and diseconomics see R. 
McKian, Efficiency in Government through Syatema .tinalYBia (1968) j C. Pearson, 
International Marine Environment Policy: The Economic Dimension (1975). 
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institute strict controls. John Hargrave explains this process 
which he labels as the" commons effect" 19 : 
"Acquisitive, self-interested and one fears myoptic nations 
control the land masses bordered by the oceans. Anyone 
of these nations may well understand . . . that the con-
tinued introduction of waste may eventually wreak havoc 
on the ocean eco-system. And yet, if that nation pays the 
price of stopping its own practices, the ocean may never-
theless continue to be subject to the same threat from its 
use as a sink from other nations. . . ." lIO 
Thus, a nation gains little from the costs expended to con-
trol pollution so that an economic disincentive to control pol-
lution exists. In addition to this external nature of pollution 
costs, states recognize that if they employ funds to control 
pollution, other nations will gain an economic advantage since 
the costs of pollution control must be reHected in the costs of 
goods produced. II 
These two factors have resulted in the elimination of any 
economic rationale for expenditures for pollution control by 
individual states. Coupled with a lack: of international controls, 
these di,sincentives to control pollution result in destruction of 
the ocean environment. 
2. THE ECONOMIC CLAsH BETWEEN THE INDUSTBTAJJZED AND 
DEVELOPING STATES 
Some commentators have suggested that the economic debate 
surrounding imposition of pollution controls by international 
institutions is primarily one between developed and developing 
nations.lI2 
19 This concept of the •• commons effect" is applied in Hardin, •• The Tragedy of 
the Oommons," 162 SCIENOE 1247 (1968) to the abuse of common grazing grounds 
in England. In that situation, each farmer found it economically advantageous to 
graze large numbers of cows on commonly-held land because the feed supplied by 
that land was free. However, these internal economies soon resulted in the destruc-
tion of the land. See also Who Protect8 the Ocean? Environment and the Develop-
ment of the Law 01 the Beo, 1-7 (J. Hargrove ed. 1975). 
20 Id., Hargrove, 2. 
21 This fear is particularly prevalent among nations in the beginning stage of in· 
dustrialization. See notes 22-25, infra. 
lI2 "If a fundamental ·split between states on environmental issues occurs, it is 
most likely to be along ••• developed-developing lines." Hargrove, 8upra, note 19, 
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The primary concern of developing nations is the elimination 
of poverty by production of sufficient food and industrial goods. 
This goal has necessitated increased levels of industrialization 
and the use of chemicals in agricultural production. Pollution 
control becomes a secondary goal to be afforded only after an 
acceptable level of aftluence has been attained.23 
The developing nations also are skeptical of any attempt by 
the developed states to institute international pollution con-
trols. Such an imposition limits the third world's development 
of an industrial capacity capable of competing with the devel-
oped states.lU The developing nations also fear that pollution 
control techniques such as mandatory recycling of manufac-
tured goods would reduce world demand for raw materials the 
export of which forms the basis of their economies.2G Finally, 
developing states object to the inequity of limiting their devel-
opment through pollution control requirements while the 
developed states were free to externalize costs during their 
earlier periods of development.28 Thus, many third world 
pg. 176. See also the discussion concerning the extensive division of the developed 
and developing states at the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 
"The Stockholm Conference: A Synopsis and Analysis" 8 STANFORD JOURNAL OJ' 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 31 (1973). 
2S Baxter, "International Implications of an Efficient Tax System: Some Pre-
liminary Observations" 8 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 1, 14 (1973). 
24 , 'The Stockholm Conference: A Synopsis and Analysis," note 22, 8Up·ra 64_ 
2G For example, the Special Report to the Secretary-General of the Stockholm 
Conference stated: 
There are growing concerns among LDCs (less developed couutries) that cur-
rent environmental concern among the industrialized countries will adversely 
effect the trade position of developing countries. U.N. Conference 011 the Human 
Environment, "Report of a Panel of Expel'ts Commend by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment," Annex I at 9. 
U.N. Doc. A/Conf_ 48/10 (1971), reprinted as "Environment and Development: 
The Founex Report," 586 INTERNATIONAL CONCILJATION 7 (1972). 
281d. Although Secretary-General Strong of the Stockholm Conference announced 
the "emergence of a new synthesis between development and the environment." 
Stoc7ehoZm Confet'ence Report, ld. at 80, this is apparently little more than wishful 
thinking, for the less developed countries continue to insist that environmental 
concerns not limit economic growth. See Aleimcda, "The Confrontation Between 
Problems of Development and the Environment," 586 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIA-
TION 37 (1972); "The Stockholm Conference: A Synopsis and Analysis," supra, 
note 22. For the impact of the less developed nations on the Law of the Sea 
Conference see § In, infra. 
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nations are hesitant to expend their already limited economic 
resources for pollution control. In addition, the commitment of 
even the developed nations to pollution control may not be 
sufficiently deep to assure that they will be willing to control 
their own pollution in the long run. Even developed nations, 
particularly in times of economic recession, may not unilaterally 
internalize the costs of controlling pollution. This lack of com-
mitment to pollution control may become increasingly prevalent 
as third world nations produce increasing amounts of low cost, 
competing industrial goods. 
Thus, individual states, particularly those seeking rapid eco-
nomic development, are not motivated economically to control 
pollution. If the economic incentives to continue polluting are 
to be eliminated, the costs of pollution control must be imposed 
uniformly on all nations. Incentives to pollute must be elimi-
nated. It is submitted that the best means for producing such 
a result is the imposition of uniform standards by international 
institutions. 
C) The Need for aNew Philosophy of the Law of the Sea 
The establishment of international institutions to combat pol-
lution of the oceans also requires an alteration of traditional 
philosophical precepts. 
Since the 18th century,27 nations have debated whether the 
sea should be controlled by individual states as an extension of 
their rights of national sovereignty or whether the sea is a 
resource to be used freely by all.28 
27 Although this was the primary period of the debate concerning, the rights of 
states to employ the resources of the seas, there is evidence that the debate is a 
much older one. (See Finn, " Justinian aud the Freedom of the Seas," 19 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 716 (1925), which suggests that both the Romans 
and the Greeks adopted a variant of Grotius's concept of freedom of the seas. 
28 During the middle ages and Renaissance, Europe's maritime powers claimed 
sovereignty over large areas of the oceans, charging tariffs for the right to pass. 
With the formation of great mercantile companies, it became economically advan-
tageous for powel'ful, shipping nations to espouse a theory which allowed free access 
to the seas_ Hugo Grotius, of the Netherlands, argued that the use of the high seas 
beyond a nation's narrow territorial ship should be free to all nations. The theory 
was justified by the motion that unlike land areas, large sections of the oceans 
could not be physically controlled by anyone nation. See H. Grotius, Mare Liberum 
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Because the world's most powerful nations were the leading 
mercantile powers and would gain from free passage, the inter-
national community adopted the notion that the seas beyond a 
nation's narrow territorial strip are free to all nations. While 
this doctrine of free use of the high seas granted the nations 
the right of free navigation, it also permitted nations to use the 
seas for other activities including dumping of wastes. 
While the traditional concept of freedom of the seas has failed 
to control pollution,29 the philosophical alternative-that indi-
vidual nations may claim sovereignty over large portions of the 
seas-also offers little solution to the problem of ocean pollu-
tion. States which control large portions of the oceans will not 
necessarily control pollution within those areas.so In addition, 
pollution once placed in the ocean does not recognize political 
boundaries so that pollution within even greatly expanded 
territorial waters will continue to spread to the waters and 
shores of other states and to the high seas beyond territorial 
limits. 
D. Toward A Synthesis: The Common Heritage of Mankind 
Recognizing that neither Grotius's nor Selden's theories pro-
vides an adequate philosophical basis for controlling pollution, 
international debate now centers on whether it is best to pro-
tect the oceans by expanding the traditional territorial limits or 
(Magoftln trans. 1916) j Lichton, "Grotius on the Freedom of the Seas," 53 
JURIDICAL REVIEW 226 (1941). 
Opposed to the theories of Grotius, John Selden, an Englishman, suggested that a 
nation could in fact control a large body of water and should therefore be able to 
claim it as its own. J. Selden, Of The Doni'1lia'll. and Ownership of the Sea (M. 
Nedham 1652). 
29 One commentator has concluded that: 
"For the most part, international customary law imposed no restrictions on 
an equal user and there was little thought of what might be described as an 
aoua de droit. The more man developed and the more sanitary he became, the 
more prone he was to use the sea as his sewer." 
L. Grun, "International Law and Canada's Anti Pollution Legislation," 50 OREGON 
LAw REvIEw 462, 462 (1971). 
30 Because of the fact that resources and contaminants do not respect political 
boundaries, it is unlikely that a "privatelY'owned" ocean would have produced 
better results. Who Protects the Ocean! 23-24, note 19. supra. 
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whether to create a new concept of freedom of the seas which 
includes a fiduciary responsibility to protect the oceans. 
1. EXPANDED TERRITORIAL LIMITS 
The movement to expand the three-mile limit 81 began in 1945 
when the United States claimed exclusive rights over mineral 
resources located on its continental shelf.82 Many states followed 
suit by extending their territorial jurisdiction. In the Santiago 
Declaration of 1952,83 a group of South American nations estab-
lished an exclusive economic zone extending "at least" 200 
miles from their coastlines.84 
The justification for this extension was the special need aud 
special circumstances of these developing nations.31i 
This "special circumstances" justification was reiterated by 
the Montevideo Law of the Sea Conference 86 in which additional 
Third W orId nations adopted a 200-mile economic zone. The 
81 It should be noted that some nations, such as the Soviet Union, have never 
accepted traditional limits on sovereignty over the ocean. See W. Butler, The Soviet 
Union and the Law of the Sea (1971). 
82" Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the 
Subsoil and Seabed of the Continental Shelf," Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 
10 FED. REG. 12303 (Oct. 2, 1945). 
83 Declaration on the Maritime Zone, Santiago, Chile, Aug. 18, 1972. Translated 
. and reprinted in: IV NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 533 (S. Lay, R. 
Churchill, M. Nordquist, eds. 1973). For a detailed examination see: A. Szekely, 
Latin America and the Development of the Law of the Sea (1976). For criticism of 
the claims promulgated in the Declaration see: Kunz, "Continental Shelf Inter-
national Law: Confusion and Abuse," 50 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 828, 835-50 (1956). 
84 There is no indication in the Declaration that exclusive economic zones may not 
be extended beyond 200 miles. The" special circumstances" doctrine indicates that 
such zones may be extended indefinitely. See note 35, ;'nfra. 
85 The Convention justified the extension of jurisdiction on the grounds that: 
"Governments are bound to insure for their people access to necessary food sup-
plies and to furnish them with the means of developing their economy. It is there-
fore the duty of each government to insure the conservation and protection of its 
natural resources and to regulate the use thereof to the greatest possible advantage 
of its country." Declaration on the Maritime Zone, § 14, note 33, aupra. As an 
example of this justification see the statement of Peru justifying extension on the 
basis of an unusual sea-mountain food chain. United Nations GAOR, 6th Comm. 31, 
U.N. Doc. AIC 6/SR 486 (1956). 
86 "Montevideo Declaration of the Law of the Sea," May 8, 1970, 64 AM. J. OF 
INT'L. L. 1021-22 (1970). 
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Conference proclaimed "the right (of coastal states) to estab-
lish the limits of their maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction in 
accordance with their geographical and geological charac-
teristics.8T 
The declaration permits states to establish sovereignty over 
unlimited portions of the oceans according to the special need8 
of the citizens of the nation. The" special purpose" doctrine 
has also been employed by Canada to justify the extension of 
its jurisdiction over arctic waters.3S Responding to criticism by 
the United States 89 the Canadian government maintained that: 
"Traditional principles of international law . . . are of 
little or no relevance . . . if they can be cited as precluding 
action by a coastal state to protect this environment. Such 
concepts are particularly irrelevant to an area having unique 
c~r~teristiCB."·o 
Under this theory, if a nation can establish some special need 
of its citizens or some special characteristic of its ocean en-
vironment, then it may claim an unlimited area of sovereignty.'1 
Continued adoption of this "special circumstances" concept 
portends significant danger to effective pollution control. For 
example, any state might justify use of the seas within an ex-
tended territorial limit as a dumping spot by declaring that their 
society's need for inexpensive waste disposal requires such 
action. 
8T Id., Preamble. 
8!!" Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act", 2nd Session, 28th Parliament, 18-19 
Elizabeth II, 1969-70. 
For a criticism of this act of "creeping jurisdiction" as the basis of "special 
circnmstances" generally see: Belder, " The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act: New Stre88eB on the Law of the Sea," 69 MICHIGAN LAw REvIEw 
1 (1970). 
3D "United States Department of State Press Release No. 121", April 15, 1970 • 
• 0 "Canadian Reply to U.S. Government", (April 16, 1970) IX ILM 607 (emphasis 
added). 
U The ' 'special circnmstances" doctrine has recently been applied to justify 
several jurisdictional extensions, e.g., extension of a 200 mile fishing limit by the 
former harshest critic of extension, the United States, "Fishing Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976", 16 USC § 1801 et 8eq_, Pub. L. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331, 
April 13, 1976; and destruction of the Torrey Canyon by Great Britain, see Teclafl, 
"The Impact of Environmental Concern on the Development of International Law," 
13 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL 357, 375 (1973). 
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2. THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND 
While some nations have adopted this" special circumstances" 
concept, there has been a parallel increasing acceptance of the 
notion that if the seas are to be rationally managed, they must 
be treated as a common resource of the international community 
rather than as the property of individual nations. This con-
cept is unlike the traditional doctrine of the freedom of the seas 
for the common resource theory imposes on those utilizing the 
sea's resources a responsibility to protect the ocean's resources 
in addition to granting equal access to all nations. 
This vision of the oceans as the "common heritage of man-
kind"'2 achieved international recognition when the Maltese 
ambassador to the United Nations requested that the body begin 
a movement to centralize management of the ocean's resources 
and protect the seas from pollution." 
The United Nations responded in several ways to the Am-
bassador's demand for a lhnited concept of freedom of the 
seas. It established the Permanent Committee on the Seabed." 
In addition, the General Assembly unanimously adopted the 
"Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed." The Decla-
ration recognized the seabed as the "common heritage of man-
kind, " demilitarized the zone, limited the ability of a state to 
. claim sovereignty over portions of the ocean, and called for the 
'2 This "common heritage of mankind" concept has taken several other names 
e.g., one commentator has suggested that the international community apply the 
"public trust doctrine" to international ocean management. This doctrine would 
impose responsibility on states "not only to their national, but also to all human-
kind for the maintenance, preservation, and conservation of selected uses and 
resources." Nanolo, and Ris, "The Public Trust Doctrine: A Viable Approach to 
International Environmental Protection," 5 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY 266, § 314 
(1975). This similar concept is known as "equitable utilization," see Utton, 
"International Water Quality Law," supra, note 10. 
,s , 'Malta: Request for an Inclusion of a Supplementary Message in the Agenda 
of the 22nd Session" (New York: United Nations, Aug. 18, 1967) (U.N. Doc. 
A-6695). 
See also Pardo, "An International Regime for the Deep Seabed: Developing Law 
or Developing Anarchy," 5 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 204 (1969). There 
was a general rush of rhetorical argument within the United Nations. See U.N. Doc. 
Ale lIP.V. 1525. 
"U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2340 (XXII), December 8, 1967. 
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establishment of a new international regime to govern the area 
for the benefit of all nations.411 Finally, in its Declaration of 
Principles on the Human Environment of 1972, the United 
Nations specifically imposed an obligation on nations not to 
destroy the ocean environment while using the seas." 
Thus, contrary to the actions and statements of those states 
who have recently expanded their control over portions of the 
seas, recent U.N. activities indicate that the international com-
munity has recognized the need to develop a concept of common 
ownership of the seas in which individual states are free to 
use but not destroy these commonly-held resources. If pollu-
tion levels in the oceans are to be controlled, nations must ac-
cept these limitations which they have now collectively pro-
claimed in the United Nations: that individual states must 
abandon some claims of national sovereignty and revise the 
concept of the freedom of the seas to include a responsibility to 
protect the sea through international institutions. The extent 
to which states are willing to accept this responsibility will 
determine whether the Law of the Sea Conference successfully 
develops institutions capable of protecting the ocean environ-
ment. 
m. PBEBENT CONTBOI.B ON OCEAN POLLUTION 
While it is submitted that present international structures are 
inadequate to protect the oceans, lessons learned from past 
attempts of the international community to control pollution 
should be instructive to the delegates of the Law of the Sea 
Conference seeking to construct new institutions. In the past, 
international attempts at pollution control have taken two 
forms: international common law and multinational treaties. 
til Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seas and the Ocean Floor Beyond the 
Limits of National Jurisdiction (Oftlcial Records of the General Assembly, Supp. 
No. 21) U.N. Doc. A/8721. 
48 Eaeh state has the responsibility •.. to conduct its activities so as not to cause 
damage to the environment of other states, or to the environment beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction. Declarations of Principles on the Human Environment, 
Art. 61972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/PC 
12, annes 1 (1971). 
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A) Oontemporary International Law 
Neither substantive international law nor the procedural 
structure of the international justice system are effective mech-
anisms for controlling pollution. Presently, the free use of the 
seas is limited only by the traditional commandment that a state 
must not use its property in such a manner as to injure the 
property of another state.'T. 
While international tribunals have rarely had an opportunity 
to interpret and utilize the concept,'8 in the Trail Smelter Arbi-
tration"e this doctrine was employed to control crop damage 
caused by dangerous chemicals carried by winds from Canada 
to the United States. The International Joint Committee un-
posed liability on Canada for the operation of the smelter" and 
enjoined the polluting activities stating: 
. 
"No state has the right to use or permit the use of its ter-
ritory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or 
to the territory of another or the property or persons there-
in, when the case is one of serious consequences and the in-
jury is established by clear and convincing evidence." 111 
The arbitration board required existence of several elements 
as prerequisites to recovery: 1) that the activity cause actual 
injury to another state's interests; 2) that the injury be a seri-
. ous one; and 3) that the causal relationship between the injury 
and the activity be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
47 The traditional rule is stated as, "Sic utere tuo ut alunum non laidus," Use 
your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another. The maxim 
has been consistently criticized: "Mere verbiage"; El. B. and E. 643. "No belp to 
decision", L. R. 2 Q B 247. "Utterly useless as a legal maxim"; 9 N.Y. 445. 
Black's Law DictwfltJrll (4th Ed. 1968). 
48 For example, no ease of water pollution has been submitted before the Inter-
national Court of Justice or allY other international tribunal. Blicher," An Over· 
view of International Environmental Regulation" 16, BUpra, note 7. 
49 Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. INT'L. ARB. AWARDS, 1905 (1941). For an 
examination of the background of the dispute see" Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal: 
Deeision", 35 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 684 (1941). 
110 Id., at 1976 (emphasis added). 
III This aspect of the decision-imposing liability on states for the polluting activ-
ities of individuals-is particularly significant for developing international controls 
since such controls would impose such a responsibility. This aspect of the decision 
has been strongly criticized as "incompatible with the law of state responsibility." 
Blicher, BUpra, note 7, at 21. 
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While a state might successfully seek injunctive relief from 
pollution through the international justice system if it could 
fulfill these three elements,1I2 several roadblocks preclude effec-
tive use of this system as a mechanism for international pollution 
control. 
First, because ocean pollution from an identifiable single 
source does not usually result in direct injury,58 it becomes im-
possible to trace the destruction to one source. Thus, it is diffi-
cult to fulfill the "proximate cause" and "substantial harm" 
requirements. In addition, many pollutants have unknown or 
latent effects which might not be discovered for several 
generations. M 
The requirement that the activity cause injury to the interest 
of another state becomes an obstacle to relief. Injury to the high 
seas, the common resource of the international community, is 
beyond the scope of the "sic utere" doctrine, leaving the vast 
majority of the ocean's space unprotected. Thus, international 
law is a substantively inadequate mechanism for pollution 
control.u 
In addition, the international court system is procedurally 
inadequate to provide an effective pollution control mechanism. 
For example, in the Nuclear Test Cases,1I8 Australia and New 
Zealand sued to enjoin France from continuing nuclear testing 
112 The application of the Trai' SmeUer decision to international law is unclear, 
for the decision was predicated on a convention between the United States aud 
Canada and not solely on the "sic utere" doctrine. 
58 In most cases, particularly the dumping of wastes from mU!licipal and industrial 
Bources, damage is caused by the multitude of pollutants from a multitude of sourees. 
No one source nor pollutant is solely responsible for the damage. Who Protects the 
Oceans, 149, note 18, 8Upra. 
M See note 12, 8Upra. 
1111 Two other major decisions are generally cited ill this area. In the Corfu Channel 
Case, (1949) ICJ Reports 4, the Court held that Bulgaria was liable for damage to 
English vessels caused by the failure of Bulgaria to disclose the existence of a mine 
field in the Channel. The Court imposed" every state's obligation not to knowingly 
allow its territory to be used contra.ry to the acts of other states." I d., at 22. See 
also Lake Lanouz Arbitration 12 R. INT'L. ARB. AWARDS 281 (1963); condensed 
translation in 53 AM. J. INT'L. L. 156 (1959). Neither of these cases substantially 
extends the decision in Trail Smelter. 
116 Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France) (1974) ICJ 253; Nuclear Test Cases 
(New Zealand v. France) (1974) ICJ 457. 
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in the South Pacific. The petitioner's claims were predicated 
on the sovereign right to use of the high sea free from interfer-
ence caused by nuclear fallout. 
Although the French government did not appear before the 
Court, claiming that the Court was without jurisdiction to hear 
the case,IIT the Court issued an interim order of protection de-
manding, inter alia, that France refrain from further nuclear 
tests while the dispute is litigated.1i8 France ignored the interim 
order and conducted two additional series of tests. New Zealand 
and Australia protested that the interim order had been vio-
lated.IID After a hearing on the substantive issues, the Court held 
the case moot because France declared, through press releases 
and public statements, that the tests would be shifted from above 
to below ground.50 Thus, the Court may employ procedural 
devices to avoid ruling on the merits in politically difficult pol-
lution cases.51 
liT It is a fundamental principle of international law that "no state can, without 
its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other states either to mediation 
or to arbitration, or to any other kind of specific settlement." Eastern Carelia 
ease, PCIJ REPORTS, Ser. B, No.5, p. 27. Simila.rly Article 36(2) of the Statute 
permits compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ only where both parties voluntarily 
submit. Greig, International Law, 494-513 (1970). 
One commentator has suggested that "the lack of compulsory jurisdiction has 
. made the International Court of Justice more a spectator than a participant in 
pollution contro!." Utton, 299, note 10, BUpra. 
1111 Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France) Interim Measure of Protection, (1973) 
ICJ, 106; Nuclear Test Cases (New Zealand v. France) Interim Measure of Pro-
tection (1973) ICJ 135. 
1111 Auatralia v. France ill. at 258, New Zealand v. France, id. at 462. 
tIO (1974) Auatralia v. France id. at 265, New Zealand v. France, i(l. at 466. The 
Court divided 9 to 6. The concurring opinions stressed that the dispute should have 
been dismissed on the ground that there was no general prohibition against nuclear 
testing, (1974) ICJ at 302. The dissent stressed that the Court should have ruled on 
the merits since the applicants had requested a declaratory judgment ill addition to 
their request for an order prohibiting additional tests. (1974) ICJ at 316; (1974) ICJ 
at 494. 
The majority relied heavily on the statement by France's president that "this 
l'ound of atmospheric tests would be the last" id. at 266; id. at 450. 
61 For an examination of the trend of the ICJ toward a.voiding substantive issues 
in favor of ruling on procedural grounds see: DugaI'd, "The Nuclear Test Cases and 
the Southwest Africa Cases: Some Realism About the International Judicial De-
cillions," 16 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTER~lATIONAL LAW 463 (1976). 
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Several other factors make the international justice system 
unreliable as a pollution control mechanism. First, because a 
court system works on a case-by-case basis, literally millions of 
suits by almost all states would have to be initiated before any 
significant progress could be achieved in pollution abatement. 
Second, the case method merely compensates for damage, it does 
not prevent it.62 Third, the Court system depends on injured 
states to initiate actions before it. In most ocean pollution cases; 
the complainant will be the offending state's immediate 
neighbor.68 
It is submitted that most states will not bring actions for 
the minor violations which cumulatively pollute the oceans be-
cause nations recognize that the resources required to insti-
tute suit and the potential for alienating a neighbor outweigh 
the advantages to be gained. In addition, few states have ade-
quatelycontrolled their own pollution and therefore fear rec-
iprocity. 
Thus, the present international justice system is both a sub-
stantively and procedurally inadequate mechanism for control 
of ocean pollution. 
B) Existing Treaty Agreements 
A lengthy series of recently concluded international and 
multinational conventions and treaties seek to control pollu-
tion of the world's oceans.84 However, these agreements are 
an inadequate mechanism for pollution control for they in-
clude a number of errors which the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence must seek to avoid. 
62 Thus, it has been recognized that: 
judicial tribunals are not the best method for administering international (pol-
lution control). They are largely after the fact and episodic; and, in pollution 
cases, what is needed more than punishment after the fact is ongoing adminis· 
trative machinery which will prevent the pollution before it occurs. Utton, 299 
note 10 "pra. 
68 Since most pollution is land-based, see note 8, most pollution begins in the 
offending state waters and moves into the high seas and the territorial seas of 
neighboring states. 
M For a fairly complete collection of these agreements see: vol. I-X International 
Proteotion of the Environment Vol. I-X (B. Riister, Bernd and B. Simma WI. 1977). 
/ 
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In the Geneva Convention on the High Seas,8G the 1958 
United Nations Law of the Sea Conference codified the tradi-
tional international law of the high seas 66 by adopting the" free 
use of the seas" theory and recognizing the four sets of activ-
ities which are encompassed within the freedom of the seas.8'l 
The freedom of all nations to use the sea was limited only 
by the proviso that a state's activities in the ocean must be 
taken with regard for the interests of other states.6S The 
Convention required states to enact regulations to prevent 
oil pollution from ships and pipelines 611 and pollution from 
radioactive wastes.70 
This agreement is an inadequate pollution control mechanism 
because (1) the obligation imposed by Art. 2 is no greater 
than the traditional limitation; (2) the obligation to enact 
regulations was limited to a narrow scope of pollutants; and 
(3) it provided no enforcement or dispute settlement mecba-
nisms.71 
The companion to the High Seas Convention, the Conven-
tion on the Territorial Seas and the Contiguous Zone,72 did 
not require a coastal state to control dumping of wastes with-
in its territorial waters. It merely reiterated the traditional 
right of nations to "prevent infringement of its ... sanitary 
65 Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, 29 April, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 824. 
66 The text specifically stated in the preamble that the purpose of the Conference 
was to "codify the rules of international law relating to the high seas." 
87 1. Freedom of navigation 
2. Freedom of fishing 
3. Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines 
4. Freedom to fly over the high seas 
1d., Art. 2. 
68 The free use of the seas: 
shall be exercised by all states with reasonable regard to the interests of other 
states . • • 1 d., Art. 2. 
The similarity of this statement with doctrines of "sic utere" and the decision 
of the Trail Smelter Arbitration, note 51, supra, indicate the extent to which the 
Convention was simply a codification of traditional law of the sea. 
69 Id., Art. 24. 
70 Id., Art 25. 
71 For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of the Convention see 75, infra. 
72 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Geneva, 29 April 
1958 (516 U.N.T.S. 205). 
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regulations within its territory or territorial seas."" The 
device is ineffective since (1) 90% of ocean pollution is a re-
sult of activity on the coastal state's land; (2) states attempt-
ing to attract commerce to their ports might be reluctant to 
impose pollution standards stricter than those imposed by 
neighboring ports; (3) the imposition of controls on coastal 
dumping merely shifts pollution from the territorial waters 
to the high seas. The continuing widespread pollution of the 
oceans is evidence of these inadequacies. Thus, these two 
conventions of the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention failed to 
impose an obligation upon states to control pollution either 
within their territorial waters or on the high seas. 
A series of international conventions have also been con-
cluded by the Inter-governmental Consultative Organization 
(IMCO):" The 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pol-
lution of the Sea by Oil TIl banned the discharge of oil from 
specified sizes of tankers within certain zones." States of 
registration are required to impose sanctions stringent enough 
to "discourage any unlawful discharge" and flag states were 
required to report to mco any penalties imposed for vio-
lations." Finally, the Convention required that each ship main-
tain an oil record book indicating all discharges." 
Two inadequacies prevent the convention from becoming an 
effective pollution control device. First, its provisions ap-
plied only to certain size ships, types of oil, discharges close 
to shore, and intentional discharges, thus exempting from con-
'l3Id., Art. 24(1)(a). 
,. IMCO is a specialized agency of the United Nations created by the Convention 
on the Intergovernmental Maritime Organization, 9 UST 621, TIAS 404,289 U.N;T.S. 
48 (1959); amended 17 UST1523, TIAS 6109 (1972). The primary purpose of the 
organization is to facilitate co-operation between nations in technical matters relating 
to shipping. Id., Art. 1. 
For a detailed discussion of the development of IMCO see: H. Alexander: The lAw 
of the BeG: Fifth ~flflUaZ OOflfertJ'llce of the lAw of the Sea IfI8titute, 130-159 (1970). 
'1G International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by on, 
London, May 12, 1954 (TIAS 4900); amended April 11, 1962 (17 UST 1523). 
,. See Annex A for list of prohibited zones. Generally, the zone extends 50 miles 
from the nearest land. Annex A(l). 
'1'1 Id., Art. 4. 
'SId., 4rt. VI. 
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trol a large quantity of oil pollution.79 Second, enforcement 
power was granted to the flag state which has no incentive to 
strictly enforce standards to control pollution not necessarily 
affecting their waters.so In fact, it is economically advan-
tageous for flag states to limit their enforcement since lim-
ited enforcement might persuade ships to register under the 
state's flag. Strict enforcement would simply prompt a ves-
sel to change its state of registration rather than control its 
pollution.s1 
!MCO adopted the International Convention Relating to In-
tervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Cas-
ualties S2 to permit states to prevent any "grave and immi-
nent" danger to their coastlines from oil pollution following 
a marine accident S3 by taking measures proportionate to the 
actual or potential dangers. The enforcing state must con-
sult with other states affected before taking action,s4 notify 
the owner of the vessel, and consult with the experts of IMCO.811 
Disputes over the necessity of the action taken are submitted 
79 These limitations led the United States to comment that: 
The United States does not believe that the prototype convention limited to 
damage from oil pollution is worth pursuing. Pollution damage from any cargo, 
or some broad list of cargo, is necessary to meet unknown potential problems; 
Comments of the United States Government on the questionnaire prepared by 
the Torrey Canyon Working Group of the CMI in "Liability for Pollution of 
the Seas," IMCO Doc. Leg. III/W.P.l1 Add. 5 (May 27, 1968). 
It should be noted that despite this objection the United Sta.tes now supports the 
IMCO oil conventions: "State Department Backs Conventions on International Oil 
Spill Liability" 1 E. R. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 303 (1970). 
110 For discussion of non-enforcement of pollution laws by flag states see: Boleslaw, 
Flags of Convenience: An Interna.tional Legal Study (1962); Goldie, "Development 
of an International Environmental Law: An Appraisal," 139-142 in Law, Institu-
tions, and the Global Environment (J. Hargrove, id. 1971). 
This grant of enforcement power to flag states has resulted in almost no prosecu-
tions under the 1954 Convention. IMCO: Reports on Prosecutions for Contraventions 
of the International Conventions for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 
MEPC 1 Circ. 17, 30 May 1975. 
111 For a discussion for the economic incentive for non-enforcement see: § I B. 
infra. 
S2 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases 
of Oil Pollution Casualties, Brussels, Nov. 29, 1969 (1970 ILM 25). 
113 Id., Art. I. 
114 Id., Art. III(a). 
85Id .• Art. III(b). 
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to a conciliation committee upon request of one of the par-
ties.86 If the dispute is not resolved by conciliation, it is 
then sent to an arbitration board whose award is fina1.87 
Unlike the 1954 Convention, this agreement permits action 
by the threatened state rather than the flag state. This shift 
of enforcement power is advantageous since coastal states are 
likely to take action when their coasts are threatened. How-
ever, it is only in cases of "grave danger" that coastal states 
might be expected to take action because of the balancing 
effect of other factors.88 
IYCO also now has enacted a convention imposing civil 
liability on oil polluters.89 The convention requires certain 
classes of vessels to have adequate liability insurance.9o Ac-
tions for damages are to be brought in the courts of the in-
dividual suffering damage and a decision of the court is to 
be recognized by all states.9l While the Convention creates 
an adequate system for compensating those damaged by oil 
spills from vessels by allowing them to enforce the Conven-
tion, the convention applies only to contracting states, only 
to oil pollution from ships within territorial waters, and only 
to. a limited amount of damage. In addition, only actual dam-
age to the property of individuals will be compensated. No 
compensation is available for damages to the ocean generally.92 
Because actual damages from an oil spill often exceed the 
maximum liability imposed upon shipowners by the Civil Lia-
86Id., Annex, Chap. I, Art. 1. 
87 Id., Annex, Chap. II, Art. 18-a similar process of dispute settlement has been 
included in the negotiating texts of the Law of the Sea Conferene.e, see notes 166-
169, mfra. 
88 For a discussion of the impact of other faetors in the decision·making process 
see m, 8'Upra. 
III1InternationaZ Convention on CiviZ Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1970) 
IX I.L.M. 45. 
110 Id., Art. VII. 
III 1 d., Art. IX. 
92 These limitations have led one commentator to conclude that the Civil Liability 
Convention "is perhaps the best example of the results that one can expect from 
IMCO. That Convention is totally inadequate ... " Mendelsohn," Ocean Pollution 
and the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Environment," 3 JOURNAL OF MARI-
TIME LAW AND COMMERCE 387, 389 (1972). 
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bility Convention, IMCO enacted the International Convention 
on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compen-
sation for Oil Pollution Damage.Ds The fund is supported by 
fees imposed upon terminal facilities within contracting states." 
The fund will indemnify any shipowner for damages paid be-
yond the maximum liability.DII It is submitted that while this 
convention solves the problem of inadequate liability of ship-
owners, it fails to resolve the other major difficulties of the 
IMCO conventions.D8 
Finally, the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pol-
lution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft,D7 limited to na-
tions in the area of the North Sea, is an example of stricter 
multi-national controls on ocean pollution. The Convention 
bars any dumping of certain highly dangerous substances,D8 
and conditions the dumping of less dangerous substances upon 
grant of a license by the nation in whose waters the dump-
ing would occur. DB The Convention also establishes an inter-
national commission to which all permits must be submitted. 
The commission may also include additional substances on 
the lists of regulated substances.loo 
This Convention has made a number of conceptual advances 
over the oil pollution conventions. First, it bars the emission 
. of a wide range of dangerous pollutants. Second, it requires 
that the international community have knowledge of any dump-
ing of pollutants. Finally, power to control is placed in the 
hands of nations threatened by the pollution rather than ex-
clusively in the power of flag states. 
However, this treaty is illustrative of the failure of inter-
national pollution control: (1) it fails to control pollution 
from land-based sources; (2) it does not control pollution of 
liS (1972) XI ILM 303. 
114Id., Art. X. 
1111 ld., Art. IV. Liability is limited to a total judgment of 450 million francs. 
116 See notes 74-5, aupra. 
D7 U.N. Doc. A/ AO, 138/S0 III L. 9 (February 15, 1972). 
98Id., Art. 5, See Annex A for list of prohibited substances. 
DD ld., Art. XVI. . 
100 ld., Art. XVIII. 
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the high seas; and (3) the international commission has no 
effective enforcement power. The Law of the Sea Conference 
must avoid these failures if it is to create a structure which 
will effectively control ocean pollution. 
IV. POLLUTION CONTROL AND THE THmD LAW 
OF THE SEA CONFERENCE 
Pursuant 10 a vote by the United Nations General Assem-
bly 101 the first meeting of the Third Law of the Sea Confer-
ence convened in New York on December 3, 1973 to resolve 
preliminary organizational questions. However, difficulties in 
the negotiations resulted in postponing the adoption of rules 
of procedure until the second session of the Conference at 
Caracas on July 1, 1974.102 This session created three subsid-
iary committees. 
The potential of the pollution sub-committee of the Third 
Committee 103 to create effective international mechanisms for 
101 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3029 (XXVII) § 3. December 
IS, 1972. For an extensive examination of preparations for the Third Law of the Sea 
Conference see: Stevenson and Oxman, "The Preparations for the Law of the Sea 
Conference," 6S AM. J. OJ' INT'L, L. 1 (1974). 
102 For a discussion of the rules of procedure adopted by the Conference see: 
Stevenson and Oxman, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session," 69 AM. J. OJ' INT'L. LAW 1 (1975). 
103 U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 62/30 (July 1, 1974). While the pollution subcommittee 
of the Third Committee has primary respollsibility for protection of the marine 
environment, see note 104, infra, the work of the other two committees has an impact 
on pollution control. 
The First Committee, charged with the development and protection of the non· 
living resources of the high seas, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/W.P. S/Rev. 1/ Part I, has 
failed to design a seabed authority to control the use of resources in this area. Rather, 
the authority is an entrepeneur with the primary responsibility of assuring that 
maximum profits are attained from seabed mining and that these profits are equitably 
distributed. The committee has ignored environmental protection because of eco· 
nomic concerns. This failure is particularly significant because the Third Commit-
tee has proposed that pollution control from seabed activities be within the juris· 
diction of Committee I. U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 62/W.P. S/Rev. 1/ Part III/Art. 25. 
The Second Committee, concerned with a wide· range of jurisdictional issues, has 
proposed a 200 mile economic zone which grants to coastal states exclusive jurisdic-
tion to protect the environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62jW.P. S/Rev. lIPart II/Art. 
45(d). This structure both contradicts the flag state/coastal state concurrent juris· 
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pollution control must be analyzed in light of the previously 
described need for strong international institutions. Exam-
ination of the negotiating texts 104 indicates that the Confer-
ence has rejected the notion that economic and technological 
realities demand the creation of international structures to 
control the oceans as the "common heritage of mankind." 1011 
Rather, the Conference extends the present structure of coastal 
state control of territorial waters and absence of control over 
pollution of the high seas. 
A. General Obligations 
Committee Three began the portion of the text concerned 
with pollution controP" by mandating that states "protect 
and preserve the marine environment." 107 Similar to Com-
mittee One's designation of the high seas as the "common 
diction proposed by the Third Committee, Bee infra notes 141-162, and creates the 
worst possible structure for pollution control, Bupra notes 31-41. 
The Third Committee of the Conference has principal responsibility for protec-
tion of the marine environment. U.N. Does. A/Conf. 62/c 3/ SR. 3·9 (15 July 
through 19 July). The pollution subcommittee, chaired by Jose-Luis Vallarta of 
Mexico, was to consider the general areas of: 
1) Sources of pollution and other hazards and measures to combat them. 
2) Measures to preserve the ecological balance of the marine environment. 
3) Responsibility and liability for damage to the marine environment. 
4) Rights and duties of coastal states. 
5) International co-operation. 
104 While the bulk of the work of the Committee was accomplished through in· 
formal negotiation according to the rules of procedure of the Conference, S88 Vignes, 
"Will the Third Law of the Sea Conference Work According to the ConsenBUB Rule," 
69 AM. J. OJ' IN'T'L. L. 119 (1975), the chairman of the committee has submitted two 
written negotiating texts. SingZe Negotiating Tea;t, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 62/W.P. 8/ 
Part II and Revised Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Docs. A/Conf. 62/W.P. 8/ Rev. 
11 Part II. (Hereinafter Revised Negotiating Tea;t). Although the texts are only 
informal working documents, ld., they are evidence of a consensus on issues. U.N. 
Press Release, 17, SEA/253 (17 Sept. 1976). 
1011 The First Committee has adopted the notion that non-living resources of the 
high seas belong to all mankind, U.N. Docs. A/Conf. 62/W.P. 8/Rev. 1/ Part 1/ 
Art. 3, but the Third Committee has not applied the concept to protection of the 
marine environment. For the implications of this phrase see, § IC, ~pra. 
lUll U.N. Does. A/Conf. 62/W.P. 8/Rev. I/Part III/Art. 1-44. 
1071d. Art. 2. There is no definition in the -text of the term "marine environ· 
ment." .However, the inclusion of "amenities" in Article 1, which defines poIlu· 
tion, indicates that the term should be given a broad scope. 
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heritage of man," 108 the Third Committee appears to have 
adopted a vision of the freedom of the seas more narrow 
than the traditional doctrine.loD It is submitted, however, that 
the commitment of the Conference to the notion of state re-
sponsibility to protect the "commons" is more rhetorical than 
real. This lack of commitment is demonstrated by the fact 
that after establishing this general requirement to preserve 
the ocean environment, the 1!-'irst Negotiating Text permits 
states to take into account their economic needs in develop-
ing environmental policies.110 In considering whether a state 
has discharged its obligation under the Convention with re-
spect to preventing, reducing or controlling marine pollution, 
due regard must be paid to all relevant factors including in 
particular the economic and financial ability of a state to pro-
vide the resources necessary for the discharge of such obli-
gations and the stage of economic development of the state. 
This sliding scale of responsibility would lessen or even 
eliminate state responsibility for pollution control. While Ar-
ticle III has recently been amended to exclude this language,111 
the notion that individual states rather than the international 
community will determine the acceptable level of their pol-
lution control pervades the remainder of the present negotiating 
text. ll2 In addition to the general obligation to preserve the 
environment, the text also imposes an obligation on states 
108 See note 103 BUpra. 
109 For an explanation of the tra,ditional concept of "freedom of the seas" see 
notes 27-30, BUpra. The Committee's concept is more Harrow for it imposes a duty 
to protect the oceans in addition to the right to freely employ them. 
110 U.N. Docs. A/Conf. 62/W.P. S/Part III! Art. 3. This language is similar to 
the "special circumstances" doctrine employed by nations to extend the power of 
individual states to extend determine the level of this pollution control efforts. See 
notes 81-41 .upra. 
111 Article 3 of the Revi8ed Negotiating Text does not anow states to ignore the 
duty imposed by Article 2: 
States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to 
their environmental policies and in accordance with their duty to protect and 
preserve the marine environment. U.N. Docs. A/Conf. 62/W.P. S/Rev. 1/ 
Part III! Art. 3 (emphasis added). 
112 For examples of the adoption of the concept in the Revised Text see, notes 
123-5, 128-30, 139-40, infra. 
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to protect the marine environment from specific sources of 
pollution.u8 
Thus, while the initial articles of the revised text appear 
to impose wide ranging obligations on states to protect the 
marine environment and to provide the foundation for the de-
velopment of strong international institutions, such expecta-
tion is not fulfilled in the remainder of the text. 
B. Global and Regional Cooperation 
Articles 7-11 of the negotiating text impose on states a 
very general obligation to cooperate for the purposes of pol-
lution control ll4 including: notifying other states of immi-
nent pollution perils,llIi studying the problems of pollution,118 
and developing procedures to protect the environmentpT 
While this portion of the text recognizes that if ocean pol-
lution is to be controlled international cooperation is nec-
essary,118 the terms of the text are of little help in effectuating 
this cooperation. There is little reason to believe that states 
who have consistently shunned international or regional co-
operation will develop a new spirit of concern because of 
these purely rhetorical provisions. The text does not alter 
the economic realities which render pollution control disad-
vantageous and, thus, one might expect that little coopera-
tion will occur. 
While these portions of the text impose only advisory ob-
ligations, Article 7 is particularly significant for it revives 
118 Revised Negotiating Text, Art. 4 (3) a-d_ These sources include: land-based 
sources, dumping, atmospheric sources, vessel sources and equipment in exploring and 
mining the seabed. 
11. Revised Negotiating Text, Art. 7 states, 
States shall co-operate on a global basiB, directly or through competent inter-
national organizations, directly or through competent international organiza-
tions, global or regional, to formulate and elaborate international rules . • 
taking into account characteristic regional features. 
wild., Art. 8. 
UB Id" Art. 10. 
117 ld., Art. 9. 
118For the basis of this conclusion see the economic and philosophical analysis, 
§ I A-B, 8'Upra. 
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the notion that the scope of a state's obligations is controlled 
by its particular circumstances. Article 7 permits states to 
take "into account characteristic regional features" when de-
veloping cooperative measures.ll9 This language, the oper-
ative language of both the Santiago Conference 120 and the 
Canadian Arctic Pollution Act,121 may apply to both geograph-
ical characteristics of individual eco-systems and to the eco-
nomic need of certain states to use the oceans as a waste re-
ceptacle. Thus, Article 7 revives the notion of the sliding 
scale of state responsibility.122 Again, the failure of the Con-
ference to adopt an environmental emphasis rather than an 
economic one has resulted in the failure of the Conference 
to develop effective mechanisms through which states might co-
operate to control marine pollution or even to impose on states 
a universal obligation to cooperate. 
C. Technical Assistance 
The third portion of the text ll1S imposes on states a gen-
eral obligation to cooperate in the development of technical 
data and personnel, the provision of pollution control equip-
ment to developing countries, and the enhancement of the de-
veloping nations' capacity to manufacture their own pollution 
technology.126 
Once again, the obligations imposed serve only an advisory 
function. Articles 12-13 provide for no mechanism to assure 
119Id., Art. 7, Bee B'Up1'CI, note 114 for full text of Article. This is the first ex-
ample in the Revised Text of a revival of the "special circumstances" test eliminated 
from Article S. Bee note 111 B'Up1'CI. 
120 See note SS ... pro. 
121 See note S8 B'Up1'CJ. 
122 E.g. A developing nation might employ this phrase to maintain that economic 
factors preclude strict enforcement. 
128 B6't1'Ised Negottatiflg T., Art. 12-1S_ Article 12 obligates states to act 
, 'directly or through competent international or regional organizations" but neither 
states which existing organizations are appropriate nor creates new institutions. 
For posaible procedures for standard setting see N anda, "The Establishment of 
International Standards for Transnational Environmental Injury," 60 IOWA L. REv. 
1089 (1975). 
lIN B6't1'Ised N ellottatiflll Tern, Art. IS. 
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that states fulfill these obligations to provide technical assist-
ance. 
Article 13 reiterates the notion that the developed states 
should carry a heavier burden than the developing nations in 
controlling the world's pollution 125 for it provides that de-
veloping nations will receive a preference in the allocation of 
funds for pollution control from international organizations. 
While this might initially appear to be a reasonable proposal,128 
the concept is actually an application of the "sliding scale" 
concept in a context in which it makes little practical sense. 
The great majority of the world's ocean pollution presently 
is produced by the developed nations who either cannot af-
ford pollution control or who have not viewed it as a priority 
issue.127 If the goal of the pollution control subcommittee 
is to develop an international system to control marine pol-
lution, available development funds should be disbursed to max-
imize pollution control, not simply to redistribute the world '8 
income. 
This discussion of an optimal method of allocating devel-
opment ,funds may be academic for although the text directs 
funds to be appropriated to developing countries, it provides 
no mechanism for accumulating funds for development grants.128 
D. Monitoring 
Articles 14 and 15 of the text require states" as far as prac-
ticable" to monitor pollution of the marine environment and 
1:'111 Revised Negotiating Text, Art. 13 states: 
Developing States shall, for purposes of the prevention of pollution of the 
marine environment or the minimization of its effects, be granted preference in: 
a) The allocation of appropriate funds and technical assistance facilities of 
international organization, and b) the utilization of their specialized services. 
126 Presumably, developing states have fewer discretionary funds to expend on 
pollution and are in greater need of assistance. 
127 See note 5 supra. 
128 Several more reasonable methods of technology transfer and resource allocation 
have been proposed, see e.g. Keholen, "The Ocean Development Tax: An Instrument 
to Advance the Rapid Development of the Marine Environment," in From the Law 
of the Sea Towards an Ocean Space Regime 61 (E. Bohme ed. 1972); Weiss, "Tech-
nology Transfer and the Oceans," in Law of the Sea: The Emerging Regime of the 
Oceans. 81 (J. Gamble and G. Pontecorvo ed. 1973). See also note 134, infra. 
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to periodically report such pollution to other states.129 Again, 
this obligation is purely an advisory one, for the text pro-
vides no international enforcement of this obligation and creates 
no international institution to independently monitor or dis-
tribute data so that it might be effectively utilized. This vol-
untary system proposed by the Committee would result either 
in noncompliance (particularly from developing states which 
lack the technology, economic resources and motivation to car-
ry on monitoring) or in a mountain of unrelated, unintegrated, 
and scattered reports employing differing monitoring and re-
porting systems. Thus, even if monitoring is carried on by 
some nations, it would be a useless pollution control device. 
E. Environmental Assessment 
Article 16 of the text obligates states to produce and distribute 
environmental impact statements on any new project which 
might produce marine pollution. These reports are to be dis-
tributed in the same manner as the monitoring reports. ISO While 
this concept appears similar to the requirements of the United 
States National Environmental Policy Act,181 these provisions 
for an international system of environmental impact statements 
is again only advisory, is predicated on the practical ability of 
the individual state to file a report, and lacks any form of inter-
national enforcement. 
While a mandatory requirement of environmental impact 
statements for all projects might be burdensome, the text could 
Ill\) Revised Negotwting Text, Article 14. These provisions are even weaker than 
those presently enforced in the Dumping Convention, se;) notes 99-102, S1tpra, for the 
Law of the Sea Text creates no central authority with whom reports must be filed. 
The Article in the original text designated the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme as recipient of the reports. Even this small amount of specificity and 
centralization has been expunged from the Revised Text. In addition, the "as far 
as practicable" term allows states a justification for failure to comply: 
130 Article 16 proposes that: 
..• (states) shall, as far as practicable, assess the potential effects of such 
activities on the marine environment and shall communicate reports of the 
results of such assessments in the manner provided in Article 15 of this part 
of the Convention. 
181 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 ot seq., 83 Stat. 
852 (1970). 
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at least condition the development aid provided for in Article 
13 132 on submission and approval of an environmental impact 
statement.lS3 Although developing nations might resist such a 
requirement, if filing is a prerequisite to distribution of funds, 
states would comply rather than sacrifice the funds. 
Thus, one of the least effective provisions of the present text 
couJd become the most effective. However, this would again 
require an international structure to receive and evaluate the 
reports, raise development funds, and distribute the funds to 
qualified projects. 
F. Control of Land-Based Sources of Pollution 
Although more than 90% of the pollutants entering the ocean 
are the product of land-based activities,t84 the text of the Third 
Committee creates no effective international controls over these 
sources of pollution.1811 Article 17 138 imposes an 0 bliga tion on 
states to establish regulations to control land-based pollution, 
"taking into account" internationally agreed rules and stand-
ards. States are to cooperate in developing international 
standards. 
Several factors render the article useless as a pollution con-
trol device. First, and most obviously, the text lacks any form 
. of mechanism either to assure that international standards are 
established or enforced. Second, the text demands that in estab-
lishing international standards, international organizations take 
into account "the economic capacity of developing countries and 
132 See notes 123-127 B1tpra. 
133 A similar policy has been initiated by the World Bank which now requires 
approval of an environmental impact statement for each project before development 
funds are released for that project. See McNamara, "Providing for Environmental 
Safeguards in the Development Loans Given by the World Bank Group to the 
Developing Countries," 5 GA. J. OF INT'L. L. 540 (1975). Environmental impact 
statements are also now required before funds are appropriated for a project spon-
sored by the United States Agency for International Development, 22 C.F.R. 2167. 
41 F.R. 21093 (June 30, 1976). 
184 See note 8 B1tpra. 
135 The provisions of the article should be read in conjunction with the general and 
ineffectual obligation to eontrol land-based sources imposed by Article 4(3) (a) (i). 
lZ8 Revised Negotiating Text, Art. 17. 
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their need for economic development." 1ST Finally, the extension 
of the economic zone,lS8 would make international controls over 
land-based sources even more difficult than under the present 
weak structure.lSD There is little possibility that most pollution 
from land-based sources could be traced through 200 miles of 
water to its original source. Therefore, the coastal state could 
not be held liable for damage created by its failure to control 
land-based sources. 
Thus, the Law of the Sea Conference has done little to control 
this major source of ocean pollution. 1'" 
G. Proposed Controls on Dumping of Wastes from Vessels 
In Article 20 of the Revised Negotiating Text, the Subcom-
mittee proposes a mechanism for the control of dumping of 
wastes 1'1 from vessels which is similar to the system adopted 
187 Id., Art. 17(4). This is the clearest example of the continuing vitality of the 
"sliding scale" concept eliminated from Article 3. It is significant that the doctrine 
appearll most prominently in the portion of the text concerned with the most serioull 
source of pollution. 
188 All noted, see note 104 IUIWCI, the Second Committee has proposed that an 
exclUllive 200 mile economic zone be recognized. A coastal state has sole power to 
control land-based sources of pollution within this area. 
18D See I I IUIWCI. Only statell which can demonstrate actual harm from a specific 
polluting lIOurce possess a right of action. 
1'0 BetMed Negotiating Te!J1t, Art. 18-19 imposes similar obligations on statell to 
control pollution from seabed activities, artificial islands, and other installations 
within their jurisdiction. Inadequacies of enforcement discussed in prior scetions, 
see I II IUIWCI, are equally applicable here. 
lU The Convention adopts the definition of the term "dumping" adopted by the 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other 
Matter, done at London on 29 December 1972, Negotiating TC!J1t, Art. 20(1), which 
provides: 
(l)(a) "Dumping" means: 
(i) any deliberate disposal at sea of wastell or other matter from 
vessels, aircrafts, platforms or other man-made structures at sea; 
(ii) any deliberate disposal at sea of vessels, aircrafts, platforms or 
other man-made structures at sea; 
(b) "Dumping" does not include: 
(i) the disposal at sea of waste or other matter incidental to, or 
derived from the operation of vessels, aircrafts, platforms or other 
man-made atructures at sea and their equipment other than wastes 
or other matter transported by or to vessels ••• operating for the 
purpose of disposal of such matter or derived from the treatment 
of wastes or other matter on such vessels • . • 
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by the Convention on Dumping.l42 The proposal would require 
individual states to establish standards which are at least so 
strict as internationally-agreed standards.14s No dumping is to 
be done without a permit from the state in whose jurisdiction 
the dumping is to be carried out. Permit violations may be 
prosecuted by either the flag state or permit-issuing state. The 
standards adopted in accordance with the provisions of Article 
20 are to be enforced either by the coastal state with regard to 
dumping within its territorial waters or economic zone or by the 
flag state. 1" A state is not obligated to institute proceedings if 
another state has acted.141 
Again, the obligation imposed on individual states to limit 
dumping in accordance with international standards is merely 
advisory for no international sanctions will be imposed on 
nations who fail to comply.148 The permit process provided for 
in the text will be only as effective as each nation chooses. There 
is little incentive for states, particularly flag states, to volun-
tarily control dumping. A nation might well raise substantial 
revenues by issuing licenses for even the most heinous dumping. 
Ironically, the permit system might create a competitive inter-
national structure in which an economic advantage will be gained 
by the nation with the least stringent standards.l4T 
Although unlikely, even if nations adopt and enforce stringent 
standards, vessels will simply dump wastes in the high seas 
where no state has jurisdiction rather than in territorial waters. 
Thus, the text proposal will violate the mandate of the Con-
vention that standards should not be imposed which will simply 
(ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the more disposal 
thereof, provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims 
of this Convention. 
142 See notes 97-100 .uFa. 
14S It is once again unclear what international body is charged with adopting 
standards. 
1" BeNed Negotiating Tefl)t, Article 26(1) a-c. 
1411 Id., Art. 26(2). 
148 The advisory nature of the" obligation" imposed by this section is particularly 
evident since the text states that international bodies must only "endeavor" to 
adopt standards, not that-they are under a positive duty to do so. Id., Art. 20(4). 
14T See I n .uprG. 
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transfer pollution from one area of the ocean environment to 
another.148 
H. Proposed Controls on Vessel-Source Pollution 
Although the emission of pollutants from vessels 149 is one of 
the least significant and most effectively regulated sources of 
ocean pollution,1110 the Third Committee has devoted a majority 
of its efforts to the development of a complex structure of con-
trols. Article 21 requires that :flag states establish standards 
which are at least as stringent as international standards. In 
addition, coastal states have a right, though not an obligation, 
to enact and enforce standards within their economic zones.ll11 
Coastal states also are provided a right to adopt special stand-
ards within their economic zone "where international rules and 
standards are inadequate to meet special circumstances".1112 To 
have a special zone recognized by the international community, 
the state must publish its intent to establish the zone and submit 
its intent to the "competent international organization".ll18 The 
organization may disapprove the zone if it finds inadequate sci-
entific or economic evidence to support the need for its establish-
ment. This portion of the revised text clearly indicates that the 
Conference has accepted "special circumstances" concept 
148 Rewed Negotiating Tem, Art. 5 states: 
In taking measures to prevent, reduce or contl'01. Tlollution of the marine en· 
vironment, States shall act so as not to transfl:'r, directly or indirectly, damage 
or hazards from one area to another or transform one type of pollution into 
another. 
For a detailed examination of the dumping problem see: Bohme, "The Use of 
the Seabed as a Dumping Site Viewed from the Outcome of the F.A.O. Technical 
Conference," in From the Law 01 the Sea Towards an Ocean Space Regime 93 (E. 
Bohme ed. 1972). 
149 •• Vessel-source pollution" is not distinguished from •• ocean dumping" in the 
definition adopted by the Committee. See note 141 BUpra. 
150 See the discussion of the series of I.M.C.O. conventions controlling vessel· 
source pollution BUpra, I II. 
1111 Re'lli8ed Negotiating'Tcl&t, Article 21(4); Art. 27. Committee Two has pro· 
posed the adoption of a 200 mile economic zone. See note 104 BUpra. 
11121d., Art. 21(5). 
1118 1d. It is unclear what international organization is charged with determining 
whether a nation's request for recognition of a special zone is justified. 
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formerly employed to justify extensions of national sover-
eignty.1M 
As in the "dumping" provisions of the text/ilil Article 21 
creates a competitive situation among states in which an eco-
nomic advantage is gained by nations with the least stringent 
standards and enforcement. Such nations will be more attractive 
to shipowners as states of registry.1l1S 
Article 271117 makes clear that the primary obligation to con-
trol vessel pollution is upon the flag state. The article prescribes 
that flag states are obligated to inspect ships periodically, not 
allow ships to leave their ports which do not comply with inter-
national standards, and issue certificates of compliance with 
the pollution control and safety standards of the flag state. The 
certificates must be available on ships at all times and must be 
accepted by other states as proof of compliance unless there are 
"clear grounds" for believing that the vessel does not comply. 
A flag state may initiate proceedings for a violation wherever it 
occurs. Other states are to assist the flag states by providing 
evidence of violations. If a violation is found, the penalties im-
posed ~y the flag state "shall be adequate in severity to dis-
courage violations" .1118 
While flag states are granted primary enforcement power, 
. coastal states possess concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute vio-
lations within its territorial waters or economic zone.1111 Action 
may be taken against any ship docked in its ports wherever the 
actual discharge occurred. The coastal state may board ships 
when there are "clear grounds" for believing that standards 
have been violated so long as the boarding does not violate rights 
1M Bee ""prcz, I II - Extension of Jurisdiction, for a general discussion. 
11111 Notes 144-151, ""prll. 
IllS This concept is particularly evident when applied to competition among llag 
states. Bee note 82, "",m. 
1117 Article 27 contains the enforcement provisions which relate to violations of 
standards adopted under Article 21. 
1118 Article 27 (1) states: 
••• Flag states shall provide for the effective enforcement of such rules, stand· 
ards, laws and regulations, irrespective of where the violation occurred. 
Hill Id., Art. 27 (2-3). 
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of innocent passage.l60 The coastal state may detain the vessel 
if a violation is found. 
While considerable effort is invested in assuring that enforce-
ment will not result in abuses,181 significant danger of inter-
national conflict exists where the right to board and detain is 
employed for political rather than pollution control purposes. 
This potential risk of conflict is unwarranted for the proposed 
enforcement structure will not control vessel-source pollution.162 
Few states, particularly developing nations with limited navies 
and interest in pollution control, will devote limited defense 
funds to boarding ships to inspect their pollution discharge 
levels.l83 In addition, port authorities will be wary of strict 
enforcement because of the fear that the vessels which could not 
comply would divert their cargoes to other ports resulting in 
loss of revenue to the enforcing porUM 
I. Dispute Settlement Procedures 
Article 47 of the Revised Text provides that disputes between 
states shall be resolved as provided for in part IV of the text. 
160 Id., Art. 28. 
181 For a discussion of the concept of "innocent passage" see Knight, The Law 
of the 8ea: C(JlJe8, Documents, and Beadings, 340 (1975). 
162Section VIII of the Bevised Negotiating Text, entitled "Safeguards" and 
compriaed of Articles 33-42, attempts to eliminate the potential for pollution en-
forcement measures resulting ill hostilities. These articles provide: other states shall 
have the right to present evidence in any enforcement proceeding (Art. 33); enforce-
ment against foreign vessels may only be exercised by officials (Art. 34); enforcing 
states may not cause damage to the vessel or endanger the safety of navigation 
(Art. 35); enforcing states may not delay a vessel longer than necessary (Art. 36); 
states may not discriminate against the vessels of another state (Art. 37); a 
coastal state is preempted from bringing criminal proceedings for pollution beyond 
the territorial sea if such an action has been brought by the flag state (Art. 38) ; only 
monetary penalties may be imposed (Art. 39); states mnst notify flag states of any 
enforcement proceeding (Art. 40) ; and enforcing states are liable in mOlley damages 
for any unlawful enforcement (Art. 41). 
188 See criticisms of the proposed structure, supra, § II D. 
1M Even if coastal states do prosecute, these prosecutions may be pre·empted by 
1lag states under the provisions of Art. 38. Thus, flag states may protect their pol-
luting vessels from compliance with international standards. For the proclivity of 
1Iag states to protect their vessels. Bee note 82 8'Upra. 
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Part IV is a series of dispute settlement procedures 1811 including 
Annex IIb which specifically applies to disputes arising over the 
provisions of the pollution control articles.188 If a dispute arises: 
(1) at the request of any party to the dispute, it will be sub-
mitted to a committee of experts to be chosen from a list pro-
vided by the United Nations Environment Programme; (2) the 
committee may issue provisional orders to protect the environ-
ment while the dispute is pending, but a decision must be issued 
within five months of a hearing.18T 
Like the international judicial system, the proposed structure 
of dispute settlement is inadequate since enforcement of stand-
ards continues to be dependent on the actions of individual states 
rather than on international institutions. As suggested, indi-
vidual state enforcement is inadequate because of the require-
ment of actual harm and the disincentives to enforcement.l88 
CONCLUSION 
There is presently no rationale for individual nations to con-
trol their rapidly increasing discharge of pollutants into the 
marine ,environment. Developing nations, who seek to indus-
trialize as rapidly as possible reject any imposition which would 
slow the pace of development. Similarly, developed nations are 
. compelled to provide their citizens with employment and with 
goods produced at a cost competitive with those of the develop-
ing nations. It is submitted that the only manner in which this 
conflict between the need for pollution control and the unwilling-
ness of states to limit their polluting activities lies in the creation 
of international institutions predicated on the notions that the 
185 U.N. Docs. A/Conf. 62/W.P. 9/Rev. 1. This portion of the text contains 18 
articles and seven annexes. It is in a different status than the other portions of 
the text because it has not yet been discussed by an organ of the Conference. The 
proposal was submitted by the president of the Conference, H. Shirley Amerasinghe 
of Sri Lanka, at the request of the Conference. 
l881d., Annex lIb, Art. 1. 
167 Id., Art. 2·7. In reaching its decisions, the committee is to employ the terms 
of the Convention, the rules of international law, and the terms of any arguments 
between the parties to the dispute. Id., Art. 8. 
188 See I IIA .uprG. 
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seas are the "common heritage of man" and that no nation has 
the right to abuse this resource. 
These international institutions must be empowered to estab-
lish and enforce pollution standards which are developed to 
protect eco-systems, not economies. They must also be capable 
of raising and distributing funds so that pollution control will 
be financed by the international community. It is only through 
international financial structures that the costs of pollution can 
be effectively internalized. 
The pollution control mechanisms proposed by the Third Com-
mittee of the Law of the Sea Conference will not effectively 
control marine pollution if adopted. Rather, the Conference has 
accepted, as its philosophical basis, the notion that the marine 
environment must be sacrificed to maximize economic growth. 
Rather than create international institutions, the Conference 
has simply institutionalized the status quo structure of state 
control which has traditionally proved inadequate. 
While this failure does not portend certain doom for the 
world's oceans, it does indicate that the willingness of states 
to sacrifice elements of sovereignty to protect common resources 
does not yet equal either their rhetoric or the needs of the 
environment. 
FRED RUCKEB 
